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KATSENbu-WBOGb-W v. KATSENELENBOGEN: THROUGH THE EYES
OF THE VICTIM - MARYLAND'S CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER
AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sixty-two men, women and children died in Maryland as a result of
domestic violence in 1999. I This means that one person dies approximately every six days in Maryland at the hands of a loved one. 2 Of
those victims, twenty-six were female, twenty-six were male, and ten
were suicide victims who killed themselves after murdering their loved
ones. 3 Nationally, it is estimated that there are approximately four
million incidents of domestic violence against women alone each
year. 4 Additionally, the United States Surgeon General found that
"the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States" is
the result of beatings by their husbands, ex-husbands, or lovers and
that these beatings accounted for an astounding one-fifth of all hospital emergency room visits by women in the United States. 5
Notwithstanding these statistics, domestic violence has historically
gone unnoticed. Heightened legal and social scrutiny of domestic violence did not occur until recent decades. 6 Since then, domestic abuse
has gained widespread public attention. 7 State legislatures began to
recognize the problem and mandated a response. 8 The Maryland
General Assembly reacted in 1980 by enacting the domestic violence
statute. 9 Over the following decades the Maryland legislature broadl. Crime in Maryland-The 1999 Maryland Uniform Crime Report (1999).
2. Id.
3. Id. It is estimated that only 10% of domestic violence crimes were reported
in 1999. Id.
4. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv.
1498, 1501 (1993) [herinafter Developments in the Law]; see also Catherine F.
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 809 (1993)
("Most national estimates are obtained from surveys which have typically
excluded the very poor, those who do not speak English fluently, those
whose lives are especially chaotic, military families, and persons who are
hospitalized, homeless, institutionalized, or incarcerated.").
5. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990,83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46,46 (1992) (quoting Nikki R. Van Hightower
& Susan A. McManus, Limits of State Constitutional Guarantees: Lesson from
1<-Yforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 269 (1989».
6. Developments in the Law, sU/JTa note 4, at 150-53.
7. Klein, supra note 4, at 810.
8. See id.
9. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 4-501 to 4-516 (Supp. 2002); see also Coburn v.
Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 252, 674 A.2d 951, 955 (1996); see infra Part III.

237

238

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 32

ened the availability of protections to victims of domestic violence. 10
Passing the statute provided both civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence for the first time in Maryland. II Included in
this statutory provision was the availability of the civil protection order. I2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen,I3 recently clarified the proper standard for the issuance
of the civil protection order that is, perhaps, the most integral weapon
against domestic violence. I4
Parts II and III of this Comment will explore both the historical
background and Maryland's legislative action, which preceded the
Katsenelenbogen decision. I5 Part IV of this Comment details the procedural aspects of Maryland's, as well as other states' current domestic
violence statutes. I6 Part V explores the Katsenelenbogen decision and its
impact on Maryland's domestic violence jurisprudenceP Finally,
Parts VI and VII of this Comment will illustrate, notwithstanding the
problems inherent in the battle against domestic violence, that
through greater education and awareness within the legal community,
the civil protection order and the courts can playa vital role in winning this battle. IS

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historically, women and children were effectively ignored under
common law. I9 The early Anglo-American common law provided that
the husband was the "master of his household" and permitted him to
use "chastisement" or "corporal punishment" on his wife so long as
the punishment did not permanently injure her. 20 The medieval doctrine of covertures erased the identity of women upon their marriage
while mandating that they assent to the sexual advances of their hus10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

See infra Part III.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-508 (Supp. 2002).
See id. §§ 4-505 - 4-506.
365 Md. 122,775 A.2d 1249 (2001).
Id. at 138-39, 775 A.2d at 1259. The required standard is an individualized
objective standard measuring a victim's fear of imminent serious bodily
harm. Id.; see infra note 203 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts V. &
VI.
See infra notes 19-112 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-169 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 170-205 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206-55 and accompanying text; see also Klein, supra note 4, at
811; Regina DuFresne and Jonathan S. Greene, Increasing Remediesfor Domestic Violence: A Study of Maryland's Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom, 6 MD.
]. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 155, 172 (1995). See generally Peter Finn and Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 1990).
See Judge Michael]. Voris, The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and the
Role of the Court, 24 AKRON L. REv. 423, 423-24 (1990).
Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE LJ. 2117,2118 (1996).
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bands. 2' It is apparent that women were treated as mere property interests of the husband until the early nineteenth century.22
Unfortunately, the treatment of children during this era paralleled
that of women. 23 This abuse not only affects the women but also the
children who, in most cases, witness this violence against their
mothers. 24 Statistically, between fIfty-three and seventy percent of
men who beat women also abuse children. 25 Additionally, children
were often injured while their mothers were being beaten by the reckless behavior of their fathers. 26 Unfortunately, although indicative of
the attitude at that time, the fIrst juvenile court providing child protection was not established until 1899, more than sixty years after one
of the fIrst reported cases of child abuse. 27
Courts gradually began to recognize the rights of both women and
children. Yet, while the courts refused to endorse chastisement, they
often avoided intervention under the veil of family privacy.28 As long
as the family member was not permanently injured, the courts considered it better for the families to "draw the curtain, shut out the public
gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive."29
By the beginning of the twentieth century, state legislatures around
the country made some progress towards protecting women and children. 30 Cities began establishing domestic relations courts staffed
with social workers to help alleviate the problems of domestic violence. 3' However, both the criminal and civil justice systems continued to take a "therapeutic" role rather than one of punishment. 32
Families were urged to seek counseling and attempt to reconcile. 33
For example, as recently as the 1960's police officers were simply encouraged to preserve the peace when answering domestic violence
phone calls rather than arrest the abuser. 34
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

Voris, supra note 19, at 423-24.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 423-24.
Zorza, supra note 5, at 4M7.
Id. at 47.
Id. Sixty-two percent of sons over the age of fourteen who attempted to
intervene to protect their mothers were injured. Id.
Voris, supra note 19, at 424.
IRA M. ELLMAN, ET AL., FAMILY LAw: CAsES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 162 (3d ed.
1998) (hereinafter "ELLMAN"); Seigel, supra note 20, at 2118.
ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 162 (quoting North Carolina v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60
(1874)).
Id.; Seigel, supra note 20, at 2117-18.
ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 162. These shelters, however, were virtually nonexistent in Maryland during the early stages of the fight against domestic
violence.
See ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 162.
Id.
Id. at 161-62. The training bulletin of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police offered these instructions for domestic violence
encounters:
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The advent of the women's movement during the 1970's finally
brought about a gradual retreat from the legal and law enforcement
community's "therapeutic" view on domestic violence. 35 Currently,
many cities have shelters for battered women and mechanisms by
which they can obtain protection and live in relative safety.36 For women, years of arduous protesting and lawsuits finally effectuated
change. 37
An example of such change was the United States government's response via the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA").38 Unfortunately, a divided United States Supreme Court subsequently ruled this
Act unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison. 39 Although the Court
ruled the civil remedy of the VAWA unconstitutional,40 Chief Justice
Rehnquist endorsed the available criminal sanctions "as an appropriate exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority."41 The endorsement of a federal criminal remedy for "interstate crimes of
abuse" aided in this ongoing fight.
Maryland, just as the rest of the nation, has benefited from this
Act. 42 This Act has made available in Maryland "grants to encourage
arrests"43 as well as "civil legal assistance"44 for those in need. 45 Mter

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

4l.
42.
43.
44.
45.

For the most part these disputes are personal matters requiring no
direct police action .... Once inside the home, the officer's sole
purpose is to preserve the peace ... attempt to soothe feelings, pacify parties. . . suggest parties refer their problem to a church or a
community agency. . .. In dealing with family disputes the power
of arrest should be exercised as a last resort. The officer should
never create a problem when there is only a family problem
existing.
Id. at 163.
See id; see also Jane Murphy, Engaging With the State: The Growing Reliance on
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U J. GENDER Soc. POL'y &
L. (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Murphy].
ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 163.
Id.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332-108 Stat. 1796
(1994).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
[d. The approach taken by the Supreme Court has been criticized. Riva B.
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 949, 1024-25, 1035-44.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-14 n.5 (2000).
Office on Violence Against Women, State try State Office on Violence Against
Women Grant Activities, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/stategrants.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
Office on Violence Against Women, Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/map/arrest/1998/mdgtea.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
Office on Violence Against Women, Civil Legal Assistance Grant Program, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/map/civiI/2000/mdcla.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2003).
Office on Violence Against Women, Maryland, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/vawo/map/md.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
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the advent of the VAWA, several states attempted to battle the domestic violence problem within their own borders. 46
Finally, the legislature enacted the federal Violence Against Women
Act of 2000 ("VAWA II").47 While the first version of the Act made
important strides against domestic violence, VAWA II mandated a national commitment aimed at fighting the ongoing problem of domestic violence through federal funding. 48 The statute sends federal
money to state law school clinics, domestic violence shelters and legal
service offices in an effort to promote the fight against domestic violence at the state level. 49
Notwithstanding the respective efforts of the federal and state governments, domestic violence still exists and is still widely considered a
personal matter not within the reach of the courts or law enforcement. 50 This is the precise reason why all fifty states now have a version of the civil protection order,51 which mandates both court and
law enforcement participation in instances where persons eligible for
relief are in fear of harm. 52
III.

A.

MARYLAND'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The 1980 Domestic Violence Act

Maryland was late in joining the rest of the country in granting
some form of statutory protection against domestic violence. 53 In the
years preceding 1980, a victim of domestic violence was without substantial redress under the law. 54 In 1980, however, the Maryland Leg46. Martha R. Burt et aI., Evaluation of the Stop Block Grants to Combat Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: 1996 Repart, at http://www.ncjrs.org/vaw-chp3.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
47. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 1114 Stat. 1464
(2000).
48. Murphy, supra note 35, at nn.21-24 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., South Mountain Community College, Counseling Department, Domestic Violence, at http://www.smc.Maricopa.edu/ services/ counseling/ domestic_violence.html (last visited Sept. 14,2002) (explaining that only half
of domestic violence victims report the crime to the police because they
consider it to be a private or personal matter).
51. For an in-depth analysis of state civil protection order statutes, see Klein,
supra note 4; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1515-18, 153543.
52. See Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are l!.1fective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not?, 67 IND. LJ. 1039, 1042-43
(1992). The standard for the issuance of the civil protection order varies
within each state, although they are all designed to remove the petitioner
from a dangerous situation. See infra Part IV for a comparison.
53. See Susan Carol Elgin, Domestic Violence: Is Maryland Responding?, 28 MD. BAR
J. 43 (1995).
54. Id.
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islature enacted the Domestic Violence Act ("1980 Act").55 At that
time, the frequency of domestic violence throughout the state was unknown because domestic assaults were grouped along with statewide
assault numbers, which made it difficult to ascertain the effectiveness
of the Act. 56
The 1980 Act was only a beginning in what was, and still is, an ongoing battle against domestic violence. 57 The statute, as enacted in
1980, was restrictive in terms of whom it protected and the time limit
of the order. 58 The definition of abuse was confined to: 1) causing
serious bodily harm, 2) placing another in fear of imminent serious
bodily harm, or 3) sexual abuse of a child as defined in the criminal
code. 59 The 1980 Act only protected a "household member" who was
defined as a "spouse, blood relative or step relation as long as the
members resided together when the abuse occurred."60 Additionally,
couples that were not married could not obtain protection under the
1980 Act. 61
In terms of the duration of the order, the original act only allowed
for a temporary ex-parte order to last for five days and a subsequent
protective order to last for only fifteen days, including the time the
temporary order was in effect. 62 Such a short period of time provided
little help in preventing subsequent abuse. 63 The inadequacies of the
1980 Act were revealed in that, after its inception, only 12 domestic
violence programs existed, operating only 4 shelters. Although several changes were made to the 1980 Act in the following years, Maryland's laws still ranked "among the worst in the nation for providing
protection to victims. "64
B.

The 1992 Amendments

Fortunately for Maryland's domestic violence victims, the legislature
recognized these problems and responded with a major overhaul of
the 1980 Act in 1992.65 The changes effectively extended the window
55. MD. CODE fum., FAM. LAw §§ 4-504 - 4-516 (Supp. 2002); Elgin, supra note
53, at 43. This act included relief via the civil protection order. MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 4-504.1 - 4-506.
56. Elgin, supra note 53, at 43. Domestic assault statistics were not separately
compiled until 1982. Id.
57. Id. at 44.
58. Id.
59. Id; see supra note 68 and accompanying text for the current, more expansive, definition.
60. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44.
6l. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155 (stating that Maryland's civil
protection order was ineffective because it afforded protection to a narrow
group of individuals for a relatively limited amount of time).
65. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155.
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of relief in comparison to the original statute. 66 The changes "expanded the classes of persons eligible for relief, added types of relief
and extended the possible length of orders."67
The amendments expanded the definition of "abuse" to its current
meaning: "battery or assault and battery, serious bodily injury or
threat of such an injury; rape or sexual assault offense; or attempted
rape or sexual offense; false imprisonment and abuse of a child or
vulnerable adult."68 Further amendments in the following years added mental injury to a child to this definition. 69 Clearly, these
changes created an avenue for protection that was missing from the
1980 Act. 70
Furthermore, the 1992 amendments afforded protection to those
who previously were without redress. 71 The amendments expanded
the group of persons eligible for relief under the act to include "former spouses, current spouses who were not household members, cohabitants and vulnerable adults."72
The type of relief granted was also expanded to include emergency
family maintenance. 73 Marylandjudges were empowered to grant the
petitioner exclusive use and possession of the family home, or the automobile, for employment and childcare purposes. 74 Additionally,
the order now protects a victim much longer than 15 days?5 Maryland courts currently have the authority to grant an order for a year in
duration. 76
66. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155.
67. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 155.
68. Elgin, supra note 53, at 44-45; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (b)
(Supp. 2002).
69. Elgin, supra note 53, at 45. In the years preceding this amendment, Maryland was the only state in the nation that failed to recognize mental injury
to children. Id. The Act defines "mental injury" as "observable, identifiable, and substantial impairment of a child's mental or psychological ability
to function. The mental illness needs to be verified by two of the following:
1) licensed physician, 2) licensed psychologist or licensed social worker."
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also DuFresne, supra note 18, at 157.
72. Elgin, supra note 53, at 45. "Cohabitant" is defined as a "person who has
shared a sexual relationship with the respondent and resided with the respondent in the home for a period of at least 90 days within 1 year before
the filing of the petition." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (d) (Supp.
2002).
73. Elgin, supra note 53, at 45. Emergency family maintenance includes "financial support to be paid by the abuser to the victim during the period of the
order.' Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (g) (Supp. 2002).
74. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (Supp. 2002); see also Elgin, supra
note 53, at 45.
75. See Elgin, supra note 53, at 44.
76. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw. § 4-506(g) (Supp. 2002).
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The 1994 Domestic Violence Act

The changes in 1992 elevated Maryland domestic law from the
ranks of the nation's worst;77 however, Maryland's domestic violence
victims and the legislature continued to work on the complex
problems inherent in domestic disputes. 78 In 1994, the legislature
amended the 1980 Act to allow Maryland's police officers to arrest an
abuser without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the
abuser violated an already existing order. 79 In addition to the expanded arrest capabilities, under these new amendments, police are
also authorized to remove any firearms from the family home. 80
Additional changes granted more protection to a victim of domestic
violence. 81 In charges of assault and battery, the court can compel a
spouse-victim to testify against the abuser if "1) the charge is the second offense within the same year and 2) the spouse-victim refused to
testify when sworn in a previous trial invoking 'spousal privilege.' "82
Additionally, in Coburn v. Coburn, the court of appeals held that the
Maryland Rules of Evidence section 404(b) is inapplicable in protective order hearings. 83 The court explained that the purpose of admitting evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence protective order
hearings is not to prove the respondent's propensity for violence, but
to prove the likelihood of future abuse. 84
D.

Were These Changes Effective?

The results of a study conducted by Maryland's non-profit Public
Justice Center, just after the amendments, were positive. 85 In the
study, trained volunteers observed over two hundred domestic VIo77.
7B.
79.
80.
81.
82.

DuFresne, supra note IB, at 155; see Elgin, supra note 53, at 44.
See DuFresne, supra note IB, at 177; Elgin, supra note 53, at 45-46.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-515; see also Elgin, supra note 53, at 46.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-511.
See Elgin, supra note 53, at 46.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (2002); see also Elgin, supra note
53, at 46.
83. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 259-60, 674 A.2d 951, 959 (1996) (holding
that allegations of prior history of abuse are admissible at a protective order
hearing regardless of whether such allegations were sufficiently pleaded in
the original petition for protection); see also MD. R. EVlD. § 5-404(b) (2002).
B4. Coburn, 342 Md. at 260, 674 A.2d at 959.
85. See DuFresne, supra note 18, at 176-77. The compilation and report of this
study are comprehensively discussed in the DuFresne article. [d. DuFresne
comments that while there existed some room for error in the study (i.e.
courtroom observers had to guess petitioners' and respondents' ages by
sight), the safeguards taken by the Public Justice Center in conducting,
compiling, and reporting the study helped ensure its credibility. [d. at 164,
167. For a detailed description of the study's methodology see section III
of the DuFresne article. [d. at 163-64.

2003]

Maryland's Civil Protection Order

245

lence cases in six differentjurisdictions. s6 The volunteers studied and
collected data on numerous matters ranging from the characteristics
of the petitioners, respondents and lawyers, to the duration of the
hearings, in an attempt to ascertain the effectiveness of changes in the
law. s7
The findings indicate that victims, lawyers and judges are taking advantage of the more expansive relief available under the 1994 version
of the statute. ss For example, in many cases, abusers were ordered
away from the victims' school, place of employment and home. s9 Furthermore, some judges took full advantage of newly added provisions,
granting sole use and possession of the family vehicle to victims during the order's duration. 90 Additionally, almost all the orders granted
were of longer duration than that offered by the 1980 statute. 91 It is
important to note, however, that not all judges took full advantage of
the additional protections available to the petitioner. 92 A few judges
ordered protective orders of only 30 days, the shortest duration available under more recent version of the ACt. 93 Moreover, in a couple of
cases, judges failed to utilize any of the new remedies now available
after the amendments. 94
A recent study tided, Ecological Model of Battered Women's Experience
Over Time,95 indicates that while problems still exist with the implementation of the civil protection order statute, the increased availabil86. Id. at IS5-S6. The jurisdictions included were Anne Arundel County, Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Howard County, Montgomery County and
Prince George's County. Id. at lS6 n.S.
87. Id. at lS6.
88. Id. at 176.
89. Id. According to the study, the court ordered, at the ex-parte level, the respondent to stay away from the victim's residence in 7S% of the cases. [d. at
170. In SO% of the cases at the ex-parte level, the judges ordered the abuser
to vacate the home. Id. In 40% of the cases at the ex-parte level, the abusers
were ordered to remain away from the petitioner's place of work. Id. The
protective order hearing stage saw more consent orders, extensions and
continuances. Id. at 174. In the forty-seven cases where the judge found in
favor of the petitioner, however, the respondent was ordered to refrain
from making abusive threats 8S.1 % of the time. Id. The respondent was
ordered to refrain from contacting or harassing the petitioner in 61.7% of
these cases. Id. Finally, at the protective order stage, the respondent was
ordered to vacate the home only 29.8% of the time. Id.
90. DuFresne, supra note 18, at 176.
91. Id. (stating that just over half of the orders granted were at or near the 200day limit).
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
9S. Murphy, supra note 3S. The study was funded by an award from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice. Id. at n.30. The study was conducted by Mary Ann Dutton, Ph.D.
(Georgetown University Medical Center); Lisa Goodman, Ph.D. (Boston
College); Dorothy Lennig, Esq., out of the House of Ruth Domestic Violence Legal Clinic, Baltimore, Maryland; and by Jane C. Murphy, Esq., Pro-
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ity of protection under the statute has proven effective in curbing
some domestic violence in Maryland. 96 While the purpose of the study
was not directly aimed at determining the effectiveness of the civil
protection order, the process revealed the important role the civil
protection order can play in the life of the battered women. 97
The study examined the experiences of 406 women who sought redress from domestic violence. 98 These women were asked to fill out a
questionnaire that listed thirty-nine possible domestic violence preventative strategies. 99 These thirty-nine strategies were divided into
"public" and "private" responses and were further subdivided into six
categories of strategic responses termed: "Placating, Resistance, Safety
Planning, Legal, Formal/Network, and Informal Network."lOo The
study revealed that these women employed a combination of these
strategic responses in an attempt to remedy their respective
problems. 101
The study also revealed some alarming statistics regarding the implementation of the civil protection order. 102 More than half of the
women who filed for civil protection orders never received the order. 103 Furthermore, of the ninety-nine percent of the women who
obtained the initial ex-parte order, only forty-one percent of these women were granted the full protection order. 104 Thirty-nine percent of
the women never returned for the mandatory second hearing necessary to obtain the full protection order, and the law enforcement of-

96.
97.

98.
99.
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.

fessor of Law and Director of the Family Law Clinic at the University of
Baltimore School of Law. Id. at nn.31-32.
Id. at nn.53-58 and accompanying text.
Id. at n.35 and accompanying text. Murphy indicates "the primary purposes of the study was to identify and predict the patterns over time of
battered women's experiences of violence and abuse, their appraisals of
risk, and strategic response to violence." Id.
Id.
Id. at nn.37 - 44 and accompanying text.
Id. Placating: private strategies intended to change batterer behavior, do
not challenge his control, mayor may not involve direct communication
with the batterer; Resistance: private strategies intended to change batterer
behavior, directly challenge his control, mayor may not involve direct confrontation with the batterer; Safety Planning: private strategies which are
not intended to change batterer behavior, intended to increase resources
and/ or options for escaping or preventing a future assault, does not involve
direct communication with the batterer; Legal: public strategies intended
to change the batterer behavior, involves the use of the legal system; Formal/Network: public strategies intended to change batterer behavior or increase resources/options for escape, involves use of community (nonlegal) resources; Informal Network: private strategies which are not intended to change batterer behavior, involves the use of informal resources
such as family and friends. Id at nn. 39-44 (citing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, 81 (2000».
Murphy, supra note 35, at n.45 and accompanying text.
Id. at nn.53-56 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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ficers responsible for serving the aggressor failed to do so in half of all
cases. lOS
At first glance, these statistics appear to indicate that the expansion
of the available protections afforded by the civil protection statute
were ineffective. As Murphy indicates, however, some women chose
not to return for the second hearing because the initial ex-parte order
was effective against the aggressor. 106 In fact, after interviewing women who applied for an ex-parte order but never returned for the full
order hearing, many indicated that the ex-parte order "sent ... [the
aggressor] a message."107 Aside from the use of private methods to
prevent abuse, filing for a civil protection order ranked among the
top ten in both the most commonly used and most helpful strategies
for battered women. 108
Taken collectively, both studies indicate that the civil protection order process is not perfect. 109 Overall it appears, however, that the legislature has set the table for future proactive decisions. The new relief
available allows for judicial flexibility when fashioning the appropriate
relief. llo Now that the Maryland legislature has provided the basis for
protection, the onus falls in the hands of lawyers and judges to educate not only themselves, but also the victims. I 11 Unfortunately, an
uneducated legal community and a public that lacks awareness of the
available remedies vitiate the steps taken by the Maryland
legislature. I 12

105. Id. Courts are reluctant to grant a full protection order in the absence of
seIVice of process for fear of violating an aggressor's due process rights. See
infra Part VI.C.
106. Id. at n.S6 and accompanying text.
107. Murphy, supra note 35, at n.S6. Other responses included: "He knows she's
serious; Ex -parte was enough time for her to get her own place; Got what
she wanted, he stayed away; Good because cops check on him; Everything
went the way she wanted and he's staying away; Yes, keeping him away." Id.
lOS. Id. at app. A & B.
109. Id. Notwithstanding the expanded protection, the civil protection process
still has its imperfections. As Murphy indicates, most of the women who file
for civil protection orders are employed and obtaining a full protective order requires at least a minimum of two court appearances. Id. at n.71 and
accompanying text. Additionally, as the above-mentioned statistics indicate,
law enforcement failed to seIVe the aggressor with the ex-parte order over
half of the time. Id. at n.56 and accompanying text. Also, the lack of available, affordable legal representation increased the difficulty in obtaining a
full protection order. Id. at n.75 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 177.
111. See Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 254, 674A.2d 951, 956 (1995) (discussing that standardized, pre-printed forms are available for individuals unfamiliar with the statute); see also Klein, supra note 4, at SI2-13.
112. See Klein, supra note 4, at S13.
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PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER PURSUANT TO MARYLAND'S STATUTORY PROVISION

Purpose

The purpose of the domestic abuse statute 1l3 "is to protect and 'aid
victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and effective
remedy."'114 The statute helps establish a basic level of protection for
a temporary period of time. 11 5 The protective order is effective because of the statute's provisions that prohibit further abuse, threats of
abuse, harassment and contact with the victim.II6
Courts are also authorized, under the statute, to craft orders that
are responsive to each petitioner's respective situation. 11 7 For example, when petitioner and respondent live together, it is rare that a
simple court order to stop the abuse will have the desired effect. In
cases such as these, the court can order the abuser to vacate the common home and grant the petitioner exclusive use and possession. 1 IS
The statute defines "abuse" as an act that causes serious bodily harm,
or an act that places a person eligible for relief1l9 in fear of imminent
serious bodily harm.I20

B.

Scope

Section 4-501 of the statute authorizes the person eligible for relief
to file a petition alleging abuse against the alleged abuser, and re113. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 4-S01 - 4-S16 (Supp. 2002).
114. Coburn, 342 Md. at 2S2, 674 A.2d at 9SS (quoting Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md.
620,623, S37 A.2d 224, 22S (1988»; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4SIS (Supp. 2002). Section 4-S1S states:
(a) Established; purposes - (1) The Secretary shall establish a program in the Department of Human Resources to help victims
of domestic violence and their children; (2) The purpose of
the program is to provide for victims of domestic violence and
their children, in each region of this State:
(i) Temporary shelter or help in obtaining shelter;
(ii) Counseling
(iii) Information;
(iv) Referral; and
(v) Rehabilitation.
Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-S1S.
lIS. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S0S (Supp. 2002).
116. See id. § 4-S06(d) (1)(2).
117. See id. § 4-S06( d).
118. See id. § 4-S06(d)(4).
119. Id. § 4-S01(b) (1); see id. § 4-S01(1). The statute instructs the courts as to
those who are eligible for relief. They include current or former spouses,
cohabitants, relatives by blood, marriage, or adoption, parents, stepchildren, individuals who reside or resided with alleged abuser for at least 90
days out of the last year before filing, vulnerable adults, and individuals
who have a child in common with the alleged abuser. Id. The protection
was not always this expansive. See infra Part III.
120. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S01(b) (1).
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questing immediate and temporary relief from violence. 121 A petitioner can file in any district court or circuit court of Maryland. 122
The petition is completed under oath and may include information of
prior or pending actions between the parties the location of the respondent; financial relief requested and the location of any child or
vulnerable adult subject to the alleged abuse ifknown. 123 Also authorized by the statute is "emergency family maintenance,"124 mandating
that a respondent temporarily provide support to the victim of abuse
and to any children living in the home. 125
Temporary child custody orders are another available remedy.126
As previously discussed, children are often in harm's way when abuse
occurs in the home,127 however, temporary custody orders can help
alleviate such a risk.128 Children are often the most important aspect
12l. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501 (h).
122. [d. § 4-501 (f). The Katsenelenbogen decision is indicative of a procedural
problem inherent in the statutes practical application. At the district court
level, the judge has the discretion to move the hearing up to the circuit
court level. An appeal from a circuit court decision to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, however, could prove timely. The order's duration is
finite, lasting only one year. [d. § 4-506(g). By the time the appeal is heard
by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the order may have expired,
rendering the appeal moot. For example, both the Coburn and Katsenelenbogen appeals were rendered moot. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at
125, 775 A.2d at 1251; Coburn, 342 Md. at 250, 674 A.2d at 954. Yet, the
magnitude of the issues mandated the Court of Appeals of Maryland's attention. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 125, 775 A.2d at 1251; Coburn, 342 Md.
at 250, 674 A.2d at 954. It is doubtful that the Court of Appeals of Maryland will grant certiorari to subsequent protection order appeals in the
wake of Katsenelenbogen. Thus, the domestic violence victim would be better
served if the statute mandated the district court as the first forum, because
an appeal to the circuit court would most likely occur before the order's
expiration, allowing for at least one appellate review in a reasonable
amount of time (before the order expires). See Petitioner's Brief at 23, Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
123. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-504 (b)(ii) (1-6) (Supp. 2002).
124. [d. § 4-506(d)(9).
125. /d. The legislative history of this section of the statute describes the need
for such a remedy:
Short term financial relief can be critical to victims of domestic violence as a temporary measure to provide emergency help to victims
of abuse who are extricating themselves from violent relationships.
The use and possession of a home will not provide protection if a
victim will be evicted for failure to pay the rent or mortgage, or
does not have enough money for food or other necessities. To a
victim whose childcare responsibilities prevent her from being selfsupporting, such short-term financial relief provides an alternative
to living in a chronically violent relationship.
Petitioner Brief at 17, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139) (quoting Letter from Attorney GeneralJ.Joseph Curran,Jr. to the Honorable Walter M. Baker, Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (February 11, 1992)
(in support of bill #282».
126. MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (7) (Supp.2002).
127. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
128. Petitioner's Brief at 18, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
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ofa victim's life. I29 A batterer recognizes this reality and often threatens to harm the children, obtain custody, or deprive the victim of access to the children. I3o A temporary custody order via a petition for a
civil protection order can help remove this method of abuse from the
batterer. I3I Without the availability of such an order, many victims
would be without protection or redress and remain in an abusive
situation. 132
Visitation is an issue closely related to custody. Section 4506(d) (8) 133 authorizes the court to grant visitation to the respondent. 134 The provision, however, advises the courts to pay close attention to the safety needs of the child. I35 If the court finds that the
safety of a child or a person eligible for relief is in question, the court
can deny visitation altogether. I36
C.

Procedure/Application

In order for a person eligible for relief to benefit from the availability of frotection under the statute, he or she must first file a petition. I3 Relief under the statute is designed for pro se applicants. I38
Standard pre-printed forms are available to aid the petitioner who is
unfamiliar with the specific legal requirements of the statute. I39 The
form also allows the petitioner to check off the desired remedies, such
as emergency family maintenance or sole use and possession the family vehicle. I40 Once a petition is filed, the petitioner appears before
the court in an ex-parte hearing.141
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S06(d) (8) (Supp. 2002). Although not specifically stated in the body of the text, the statute also allows the court to
grant temporary use and possession of the family vehicle, to order the parties to counseling, to order the respondent to surrender any firearm to law
enforcement for duration of the order and to order the respondent to pay
all filing fees and costs of the proceeding. [d. §§ 4-S06(d) (10) - 4S06(d) (13).
134. [d. § 4-S06(d) (8).
13S. [d.
136. [d. This provision also allows for supervised visitation. The court has wide
discretion to fashion the visitation order in a manner most beneficial to the
child or victim. [d.; see also ABA Resolution of Safe Visitation Orders, Report
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates (Annual Meeting, July 2000)
("When crafting visitation orders, creating safety provisions that provide for
continued and consistent protection during visitation and visitation exchanges is critical.").
137. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-S0S(a) (1).
138. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 2S4, 674 A2d 9S1, 9S6 (1996).
139. [d.
140. [d.
141. [d.
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At this hearing, if a court finds that there are "reasonable grounds
to believe that a person eligible for relief has been abused," the court
can issue the temporary ex-parte protective order. 142 The petitioner
can substantiate her claim by presenting physical evidence such as
photographs, medical records, witnesses, her own testimony or anything else within reason that will help her case. 143 The statute gives
the court wide discretion, based on the petition and the evidence
presented, to grant the order and the applicable requested relief. 144
The ex-parte order lasts only seven days.145 The temporary nature of
the ex-parte order is purposeful. 146 The legislature wanted to ensure
that all due process concerns were addressed. 147 Because the hearing
is ex-parte, the court mandates a subsequent hearing before the order
can take on its most permanent form. 148 This second hearing provides the alleged abuser with notice and a chance to be heard. 149 A
court may extend the ex-parte order as needed, but only for 30 days. 150
As previously mentioned, long-term orders are not issued until a second, full hearing. 151
At this second hearing, the alleged abuser has a chance to present
evidence to contest the petitioner's earlier allegations. 152 If the respondent fails to appear, "the court may issue a final protective or142. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505(a)(1) (Supp. 2002); see also supra note
135 and accompanying text.
143. Coburn, 342 Md. at 254,674 A.2d at 956.
144. See id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956-57.
145. Id. at 255,674 A.2d at 956 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505 (c) (1)
(Supp. 2002».
146. See Coburn, 342 Md. at 259-60, 674 A.2d at 959.
147. Id. at 261, 674 A.2d at 959.
148.
149.
150.
151.

!d.

Id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956.
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505(b) & (c) (Supp. 2002».
Id. The second full hearing allows ajudge to grant an order with a duration
of twelve months. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(g).
152. Coburn, 342 Md. at 255, 374 A.2d at 956. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw
§ 4-506(a) (Supp. 2002». The statute does not specifically address the type

of evidence allowed at a final hearing although section 4-506(e) does provide the court with some guidance when it discusses the order to vacate the
home. The factors are:
1) the housing needs of any minor child living in the home,
2) the duration of the relationship between the respondent and
any person eligible for relief,
3) title to the home,
4) pendency and type of criminal charges against the respondent,
5) the history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the
respondent and any person eligible for relief,
6) the existence of alternative housing for the respondent and any
person eligible for relief, and
7) the financial resources of the respondent and the person eligible for relief.
Id. at 256,674 A.2d at 957 (citing MD. CODE ANN, FAM. LAw § 4-506(e) (1-7)
(Supp. 2002». Also important in the evidentiary determination of abuse is
the form that allows the petitioner to include evidence "known to the peti-
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der ... as long as the respondent has been seIVed with the temporary
protective order or the court otherwise has personal jurisdiction over
the respondent." 153
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that abuse has
occurred, then the court is authorized to grant a final order, and utilize all the relevant remedies. 154 The Coburn court notes several sections within the Family Law Act that direct a court as to what
constitutes clear and convincing evidence. 155 Evidence of a previous
abuse and the severity of the abuse are both examples of what may
constitute clear and convincing evidence that abuse has or may
occur. 156
The statute also provides for a modification of the final order if all
the affected persons are notified and a hearing occurs.157 At the modification hearing, based on the petitioner's evidence, a court can extend the order for six months beyond the time limit of section 4506(g).158

D.

State Comparison

Similar remedies are prevalent throughout the country.159 Every
state has a civil protection order statute. 160 All but six states have similarly broad statutory provisions that give the courts wide discretion
when fashioning custody and visitation arrangements under these orders.161 Similarly, at least forty states and territories have provisions
that provide for emergency family maintenance. 162 Additionally, the

153.
154.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

162.

tioner concerning previous injury." Id. at 256-57, 674 A.2d at 957 (citing
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-504(b)(ii)(l) (Supp.2002)).
Id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956.
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(c)(I)(ii) (Supp. 2002)).
When determining what is "clear and convincing," the court looks to several factors all of which are listed. See supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
Coburn, 342 Md. at 256-57, 674 A.2d at 957.
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(c) (1) (ii) (Supp. 2002)). For a
further discussion concerning the evidentiary standards see infra Part V.
Id. (citing MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(c)(l)(ii) (Supp.2002)).
Id. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956.
See Klein, supra note 4, at 1043-44; see also infra Part VI.B.
See supra note 51.
Petitioner's Brief at 20, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). States permitting courts
to award temporary custody protective order proceedings include: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. See MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(6) (Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B3:(a)(4) (2000); S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(c)(l) (Law Co-op. 2000); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-279, 1 (A)(7) (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE § 4827(503) (3) (2000).
Petitioner's Brief at 20-21, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). States permitting
courts to award temporary financial relief in protective order proceedings
include: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia. See
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (9) (Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B-3:(a) (6) & (7) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (c) (2) (Law Co-op.
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National Council ofJuvenile and Family CourtJudges advocate similar
provisions. 163 Surprisingly, only thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia offer the protection of a civil protection order to a child of
one or both of the parents involved in the dispute. 164
The presence of a child of unmarried parents also permits several
state courts to issue civil protection orders between the parents of the
child. 165 Additionally, forty-one states offer civil protection orders to
unmarried partners of different genders that live together as
spouses. 166
Eight progressive states have expanded their definition of persons
eligible for relief under a civil protection order to include parties in a
dating relationship.167 Overall, most states are continually taking

163.

164.

165.

166.

167.

1985 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-503(4) & (5) (Michie
2001).
See FAMILY VIOLENCE: A MODEL STATE CODE § 306(3) (d) (Nat'l Council of
Juvenile & Family Court Judges, 1994).
Klein, supra note 4, at 820; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (9)
(Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3:(a) (6) & (7) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-60 (c) (2) (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4827-503(4) & (5) (Michie 2001); Diehl v. Drummond, 2 Pa. D. 376, 378-79
(1989) (limiting the forum for the issuance of a civil protection order for a
child to the juvenile courts).
Klein, supra note 4, at 824; see also Robinson v. United States, 317 A.2d 508,
510 -11 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a protection order may be issued on
behalf of a child against the child's mother's boyfriend with whom she and
the child had lived for three years).
Id. at 824; see also Yankoskie v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (articulating five factors that are characteristic of persons living together as spouses: 1) the duration of the relationship, 2) the frequency of
contact, 3) the parties financial interdependence, 4) whether the parties
raised the children together, and 5) whether the parties engaged in tasks
designed to maintain a common household). But see Jackson v. United
States, 357 A.2d 409 (App. D.C. 1976) (holding no mutual residence for
purposes of issuing a protection order where couple only lived together for
three months, the defendant did not pay rent, the petitioner considered
the apartment hers, the couple had no children in common, and the defendant gave his mother's address as his residence).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) ("person with whom the respondent
has had a dating or engagement relationship"); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
209A, § 1 (West 1992). Defining family or household members as those
who:
[A]re or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship, which shall be adjudged by district, probate or Boston municipal courts consideration of the following factors: 1) the length of
time of the relationship; 2) the type of relationship; 3) the frequency of interaction between the parties; and 4) if the relationship has been terminated by either person, the length of time
elapsed since the termination of the relationship.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § l(e)(l) (West 1992); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:l(XV) (2001) ("'Intimate partners' means persons currently
or formerly involved in a romantic relationship, whether or not such relationship was ever sexually consummated"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2
(Michie 2002) ("person with whom petitioner has had a continuing personal relationship"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.07.1-01 (Supp. 2001) ("'family
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strides to expand their respective domestic violence protection acts. 168
It is now up to the legal communities throughout the United States to
employ this progressive legislation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
took a step in that direction with its decision in Katsenelenbogen v.
Katsenelenbogen. 169
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently clarified a decision by
the court of special appeals in Katsenelenbogen. 170 In so doing, the
court emphatically stated that the lower court's decision did not
weaken the state's efforts to obviate domestic violence. 171 The court
held: 1) that a trial court's fashioning of appropriate relief in domestic violence cases should not be concerned with the consequences that
such relief might have in other litigation, and (2) the proper standard
for determining whether a victim's fear of imminent serious bodily
harm is reasonable, thus warranting a protective order, is an individualized objective one. 172
In this case the parties were married in April of 1986, and had three
children. 173 The marital home was titled in the names of both parties. 174 Mrs. Katsenelenbogen was a pediatric nurse and worked approximately twenty-four hours a week. 175 She took medication for a
chronic back problem, and had a live-in nanny to help care for the
children. 176

168.
169.
170.
17l.
172.

173.
174.
175.
176.

or household member' means ... persons who are in a dating relationship
... (or) any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing person"); 23 PA. CaNST. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (West 2002) ("sexual or intimate
partners"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(2) (West 2002). A dating
relationship is defined under the statute as a social relationship between
persons sixteen years of age or older that is romantic in nature. Id.
§ 26.50.010(3). Factors that the court may consider in making this determination include: (a) the length of time the relationship has existed; (b) the
nature of the relationship; and (c) the frequency of interaction between
the parties. Id.; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-207 (Michie Supp. 2001) ("are or
were dating").
See genfffally Klein, supra note 4, at 912.
See supra note 13.
Id.
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135, 775 A.2d at 1257.
Id. at 137 -39,775 A.2d at 1258-59. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota took
a similar approach when it ruled that a court may issue a civil protection
order, "not only for actual physical harm, but also for acts which inflict the
fear of imminent bodily injury." Klein, supra note 4, at 848 (citing Hall v.
Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. App. 1987)). The court added that while the
court must find some overt action indicating abuse, the court does not
need to find an "overt physical act." Id. (citing Knuth v. Knuth, 1992 WL
145387 (1992)).
Petitioner's Brief at 2, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 322, 762 A.2d at 200.
Id.
Id.
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On or about December 9, 1999, Mrs. Katsenelenbogen asked Mr.
Katsenelenbogen to move out of the marital home, and he refused to
leave. 177 On January 1, 2000, Mr. Katsenelenbogen advised the live-in
nanny that she was fired and would have to vacate the marital home
because he wanted to use the room that she had been occupying. 178
When Mrs. Katsenelenbogen learned of this, and after consulting her
lawyer, she told Mr. Katsenelenbogen that he could not force the
nanny to leave. 179 During that conversation between the parties, Mr.
Katsenelenbogen used a cordless telephone to call the police. 180
While making the call, he walked out of the house onto the driveway,
and Mrs. Katsenelenbogen followed him.181 One of the parties' children, Alexander, age 9, followed Mrs. Katsenelenbogen. 182 Mter Mr.
Katsenelenbogen finished his conversation with the police, he dialed
another number and began speaking in Russian. 183 Mrs. Katsenelenbogen continued to request the phone, and according to her,
Mr. Katsenelenbogen shoved her by placing his left hand on her
shoulder. 184 Also, according to Mrs. Katsenelenbogen, Alexander
placed himself between them, and Mr. Katsenelenbogen then shoved
the child. 185 Mr. Katsenelenbogen "testified that . . . [Mrs. Katsenelenbogen] followed him, but he denied any contact."186 Prior to
January 1, 2000, there was no record of Mr. Katsenelenbogen ever
abusing his wife. 187
Mrs. Katsenelenbogen filed a petition for protection from domestic
violence on January 3, 2000. 188 In that petition she stated that, "she
was filing it on behalf of herself and Alexander, claiming, 'shoving,'
'threats of violence,' and 'mental injury of a child.' "189 The incident
that occurred on January 1, 2000, was described in an attachment to
the petition. 190 The ex-parteorderwas issued on January 3,2000, and a
hearing on the order was scheduled for January 10, 2000. 191
At the January 10th hearing, both Mr. and Mrs. Katsenelenbogen
testified. 192 The circuit court issued a protective order, reciting that
Mrs. Katsenelenbogen was a person eligible for relief due to the Janu177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 322, 762 A.2d at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322-23, 762 A.2d at 201.
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 322, 762 A.2d at 201.
Id. at 323, 762 A.2d at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 323, 762 A.2d at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ary 1, 2000, incident in which Mr. Katsenelenbogen shoved his wife
and their nine-year old son, Alexander. 193 According to the order
that was executed by the court, Mrs. Katsenelenbogen was "badly
shaken" and "afraid for her safety."194 On the protective order the
only abuse cited was an act, "which placed a person eligible for relief
in fear of imminent serious bodily harm."195
The protective order was effective until January 3, 2001. 196 In addition, the court ordered that: Mr. Katsenelenbogen was not to contact
Mrs. Katsenelenbogen except for purposes of visitation and to vacate
the family home; custody of the three children was awarded to Mrs.
Katsenelenbogen; emergency family maintenance was awarded to the
wife; and exclusive use and possession of the family vehicle was
awarded to Mrs. Katsenelenbogen. 197
The court's holding noted that the legislature made every attempt
to ensure that the filing of a civil protection order would only occur in
genuine instances of abuse. 198 The legislature requires all petitioners
to file the petition under oath, and the petitioners must reveal any
prior or pending actions between the parties. 199 The statute also provides an avenue for modification. 2oo The court opined that, with
these safeguards in place, other courts must not concern themselves
with the consequences the order may have on pending or subsequent
litigation. 201
The court also clarified the standard by which the petitioner's fear
is measured. 202 The court held that it is an individualized objective
standard- "one that looks at the situation in the light of the circumstances as would be perceived by a reasonable person in the petitioner's position."203 The court added that a person "may well be
sensitive to non-verbal signals or code words that have proved threatening in the past to that victim but which someone else, not having
that experience, would not perceive to be threatening."204 Accordingly, when Mr. Katsenelenbogen shoved his wife and their child, the
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

[d.
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 323, 762 A.2d at 201.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135-37, 775 A.2d at 1257-58.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-504(b) (Supp. 2002).
ld. § 4-507(a).
See Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135-37, 775 A.2d at 1257-58. Contra Piper
v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 753,726 A.2d 887, 891 (1999) (discussing the
"stigma" that attaches to a respondent when an order is issued against him/
her).
202. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 138, 775 A.2d at 1259.
203. [d.
204. [d. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259. Social science research indicates that threats of
this type, if left unchecked, will commonly escalate into physical violence.
Klein, supra note 4, at 859. Courts throughout the United States recognize a
wide range of varying threats that will substantiate the issuance of a civil
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court issued an order. 205 With these newly defined standards in mind,
one can now explore the role of the court in fashioning relief through
a civil protection order.
VI.

A.

ANALYSIS

Analysis of The Court of Appeals Decision in the Instant Case.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis of the court of
special appeals' decision by examining the arguments of the petitioner. 206 The petitioner claimed the lower court erred in three
ways.207 First, that the court of special appeals' decision suggests that
certain types of domestic violence are permissible. 208 Second, that the
petitioner argued that the lower court placed too much emphasis on
the protective order's subsequent effect on future litigation. 209 Finally, the petitioner argued that future petitioners could view the
lower court decision as endorsing an objective standard, rather than
an individualized objective standard for measuring the fear of imminent bodily harm. 210
The Court of Appeals of Maryland then addressed each argument.
The court disposed of the first argument by stating that the lower
court did not intend "any such absurd conclusion," adding that the

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

2lO.

protection order, with the most common being a death threat. Id. at 8606l.
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 127, 762 A.2d at 1252-53.
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 134, 775 A.2d at 1256-57.
Id. 365 at 134-40, 775 A.2d at 1257-60; see also Petitioner's Brief at 12, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 134, 775 A.2d at 1257; Petitioner's Brief at 12,
Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135, 775 A.2d at 1257; see also Petitioner's Brief
at 26-27, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). Petitioner argues in her brief that while
a protective order may have some effect on a future custody proceeding,
courts still are bound by the "best interest of the child" standard and the
presence of an order only lends to that determination and should not be
ignored. Id. at 26-30. The Petitioner's argument is not wholly unreasonable
in light of the statements made by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland:
If a protective order is issued without a sufficient legal basis, those
consequences frequently cannot be erased. In that situation, the
alleged perpetrator may suffer unfairly from the direct consequences of the order itself, which may include removal from his or
her home, temporary loss of custody ... [t]he alleged perpetrator
may also suffer from the social stigma that attaches to the order.
Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. at 335, 762 A.2d at 207.
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 138, 775 A.2d at 1259; see also Petitioner's Brief
at 26-30, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139). Petitioner argued that the "reasonable
petitioner in that litigant's shoes is necessary ... [because] [d]omestic violence, by definition, is not an offense that occurs between strangers." Id. at
33. Another argument, not mentioned by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, offered by the petitioner was that the "persons eligible for relief' covers such a wide range of people that a reasonable standard would simply be
unfair. See id. at 33-34.
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lower court would have reversed the decision outright if it meant to
classify the abuse in the instant case as insufficient to warrant a protective order. 211
In response to the petitioner's second argument, the court of appeals noted nothing in the court of special appeals' opinion indicating that the respondent, Mr. Katsenelenbogen, deserves extra
protection in subsequent litigation. 212 The court of appeals did concede that a protective order may have an effect on subsequent litigation, however, the court should only be concerned with doing what is
"reasonably necessary ... to assure the safety and well-being of those
entitled to relief."213 Additionally, as the petitioner argued, the legislature included several safeguards to prevent any spurious claims. 214
The court indicated that the difficulty of overcoming the "clear and
convincing" standard, the requirement that the petitioner take an
oath and the requirement that the petitioner reveal all other collateral litigation between the parties, provide ample protection to the
respondent. 215
Finally, the court addressed the final issue: the proper standard for
measuring a petitioner's fear of imminent bodily harm pursuant to
§ 4-501 (b).216 The petitioner urged that the standard be "a reasonable
petitioner in that litigant's shoes."217 The court agreed with the petitioner, stating that the proper standard is an "individualized objective
one."218
The court cited State v. Marr,219 a recent decision by the court that
involves a similar individualized objective standard "applied in determining whether a criminal defendant offering the defense of self-defense had reasonable grounds to believe himself or herself in
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

216.
217.
218.

219.

Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 134-35, 775 A.2d at 1257.
See id. at 135, 775 A.2d at 1257.
See id. at 1:37, 775 A.2d at 1258.
See id. at 135-36, 775 A.2d at 1257-58; see Petitioner's Brief at 22-24, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
See Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 135-36, 775 A.2d at 1257. Petitioner also
mentions that the requirement of de novo review is yet another protection
against the dubious petitioner. Petitioner's Brief at 23, Katsenelenbogen (No.
139); see also Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 622, 537 A.2d 225 (1988). The
petitioner also adds that trial court judge continually offered advice to the
parties during the hearing for the final order, thus providing an additional
safeguard to the respondent. Petitioner's Brief at 24, Katsenelenbogen (No.
139).
See Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259-60; see supra note 203
and accompanying text.
Id. at 138, 775 A.2d at 1259.
Id. Petitioner also argued domestic violence is intimate and specific and
that a petitioner would be ill served by an "externally constructed" and
"non-individualized paradigm." See Petitioner's Brief at 34-35, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
362 Md. 467, 765 A.2d 645 (2001).
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apparent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm."22o In
that case, the court noted that the "objective standard does not require the jury to ignore the defendant's perceptions in determining
the reasonableness of his or her conduct . . . so long as a reasonable
person in the defendant's position could also reasonably perceive the facts or
circumstances in that way."221 The court added in Marr that the issue is
not whether the defendant's perception is right or wrong, "but
whether a reasonable person with that background could perceive the
situation in the same way."222 Finally, the court clarified any residual
ambiguity remaining in the court of special appeals decision by stating
"[a]ny special vulnerability or dependence by the victim, by virtue of
physical, mental, or emotional condition or impairment, also must be
taken into account."223
The Court of Appeals of Maryland made it clear that courts were
not to examine the subsequent effect the civil protection order will
have on future litigation. 224 The ruling further solidifies the court's
role as an impartial fact finder. While this ruling is imperative if the
civil protection order is to remain effective, some argue it still leaves
room for the dubious petitioner attempting to gain a tactical advantage in future litigation. 225 The court cannot ignore the motives of the
220. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 138-39, 775 A.2d at 1259.
221. Id. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259. Petitioner also noted a similar standard is used
in sexual harassment cases. Petitioner's Brief at 38, Katsenelenbogen (No.
139). Sexual harassment cases in Maryland utilize an individualized objective standard. Id. Before 1986, however, this was not the case. It was not
until an influential dissent by Judge Keith in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) that courts began to recognize the need for an
individualized standard. Id. The Maryland Legislature also recognized the
necessity of the individualized objective standard in battered women syndrome cases. Id. at 40. In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422, 608 A.2d 1249
(1992), the court recognized that habitual victims of abuse are "expert[s] at
recognizing the warning signs of an impending assault from [their] partner[s]." 92 Md. App. at 429,608 A.2d at 1252.
222. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1259; see also Parker v. State, 66
Md. App. 1, 9, 502 A.2d 510, 514 (1986) (holding that when evaluating
whether the arrest was proper, the court did not use a generic reasonable
person standard, instead, it found that the proper standard is to view the
circumstances "from that of the prudent and cautious police officer on the
scene"). This type of standard is necessary in the instant case. While some
may not consider a shove sufficient enough to place a petitioner in fear of
imminent bodily harm, Mrs. Katsenelenbogen had chronic back problems
that permanently disabled her. Id. at 126, 502 A.2d at 1251. As a result, she
had a reduced work schedule, a handicapped parking permit, medication
and used the assistance of a nanny. Id. at 126, 502 A.2d at 1252. Under
these conditions, it is clear that a shove would constitute abuse as defined
by the statute. Id. at 139, 502 A.2d at 1259. In the absence of an individualized objective standard, however, such actions may not warrant protection.
Petitioner's Brief at 35, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
223. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, 775 A.2d at 1260.
224. Id. at 137, 775 A.2d at 1258.
225. Katsenelenbogen, 135 Md. App. 317, 343, 762 A.2d 198, 212.
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petitioner. Although the statute is designed to prevent further harm,
such harm could manifest in the form of petjury.
The court, however, made the correct decision in the instant case.
The civil protection order can be used for effective and immediate
relief if drafted properly.226 The benefits afforded to victims who seek
relief via the civil protection order arguably outweigh the burden of
the few specious petitioners who attempt to gain a tactical advantage
in future litigation between the parties.

B.

Standards Applied in Other States

Other states have adopted individualized objective standards when
confronted with similar situations. 227 Two states actually employ a
subjective standard. 228 Ohio uses a subjective state of mind standard
when determining if a petitioner is in fear of imminent serious harm,
so long as, that state of mind is not "utterly irrational."229 Similarly,
North Carolina case law articulates the language of the standard as
"placing the aggrieved party . . . in fear of imminent serious bodily
i~ury."23o

Two other states consider their test to be objective, however, they
individualize them. 231 New Jersey mandates a court look to the petitioner's "objective fear" but then classify the fear as that "which a reasonable victim similarly situated would have under the
circumstances."232 North Dakota defines its standard in the following
manner: "Intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another
person. Disorderly conduct does not include constitutionally protected activities."233 The highest court in North Dakota further elucidated in Williams v. Spilovof34 that" [b] ecause of previous physical or
226. Klein, supra note 4, at 813. A properly drafted and enforced civil protection
order is an effective way to reduce domestic violence. [d. Lack of sufficient
detail, irregular enforcement and an uneducated legal community, however, vitiate the order's effectiveness. [d.
227. Petitioner's Brief at 45, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
228. [d.
229. [d. (citing Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 613 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Oh. App.
1992».
230. !d. (citing Brandon v. Brandon, 513 S.E.2d 589, 595 (N.C. App. 1999»
("The plain language used by our legislature does not require a trial court
to attempt to determine whether the plaintiff's actual subjective fear is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.").
231. Petitioner's Brief at 46, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
232. [d. (citing Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751,758 (1995». The New Jersey
standard takes into account the "power and control" element present in
most instances of domestic abuse. [d. Under this type of standard, Mr.
Katsene1enbogen's actions, such as abusing the family pet, isolating his disabled wife by firing her live in nanny, verbally abusing his wife in front of
their children, would all be considered. [d.
233. [d. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(1) (Supp.2001».
234. 536 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1995).
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emotional abuse, in some instances, the person restrained is well
aware that his or her mere presence is sufficient to cause such emotional stress as to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of the
other person."235 Accordingly, a North Dakota court may issue protective orders based,on the mere presence of a respondent. 236
C.

Constitutional Analysis

Maryland's legislature, like most other states, has made every attempt to ensure that the protective order statute is constitutional. 237
The initial ex-parte hearing raises some due process concerns because
the respondent is not present. 238 The constitutionality of this process,
however, has been upheld because the temporary order is granted in
emergency situations and is of limited duration. 239 Also, in Maryland,
a court can grant a final order notwithstanding the absence of the
respondent. 24o The Maryland court warns, however, that sufficient
notice in the form of service of process must precede the final order
hearing as to satisfy due process notice concerns. 241
While Maryland's civil protection order statute has not faced a constitutional challenge, domestic violence statutes, including the civil
protection order provisions, have endured a myriad of constitutional
challenges around the country.242 Several courts have ruled that the
language of these statutes are not unconstitutionally vague. 243 A Wisconsin court upheld the state's civil protection standard against the
235. [d. at 385 (N.D. 1995) (citing State v. Monson, 518 N.w.2d 171 (N.D.
1994»; see also Petitioner's Brief at 47, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139).
236. Petitioner's Brief at 47, Katsenelenbogen (No. 139); see also Williams, 536
N.W.2d at 385.
237. See Klein, supra note 4, at 905 n.633 (stating that Arkansas had the only
statute struck down on a constitutional basis but has since revised that statute as to make it constitutional).
238. See Voris, supra note 19, at 431 (citing Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767
(C.P. Alleg. 1979); Missouri v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984».
239. Voris, supra note 19, at 431. Ohio's temporary order lasts for ten days as
compared to Maryland's that lasts only seven. [d.; Coburn, 342 Md. at 255,
674 A.2d at 956.
240. Coburn, 342 Md. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956.
241. [d. at 255-56, 674 A.2d at 956-57. The court also states that as long as the
court has some personal jurisdiction over the respondent, it can issue the
final order in the absence of the defendant. [d. at 255, 674 A.2d at 956.
242. See supra Part VI.C.
243. See Klein, supra note 4, at 905-06 nn.637-644. In Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d
1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), the court ruled that a civil protection
order that ordered the respondent not to "visit" the victim or "otheIWise
interfere" with his wife was not unconstitutionally vague. See Klein, supra
note 4, at 905 n.637. Similarly, a Missouri court held in Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750
S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), that a protective order that prevented
the husband from entering the marital home was not unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad in light of the physical damage the husband had done
in the house. See Klein, supra note 4, at 905 n.640.
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constitutional arguments that the statute was irrational and unreasonable to effectuate its statutory purpose. 244 The petitioner argued that
the statute deprived him of liberty interests in his home, family and
reputation. 245 The petitioner also argued that the application of the
statute results in cruel and unusual punishment and violates the fundamental rights implied in the Ninth Amendment. 246 The court dismissed these constitutional claims and upheld the statute. 247
Similarly, state courts have upheld civil protection statutes against
freedom of speech, association and equal protection challenges. 248
The procedural aspects of most civil protection statutes have also been
upheld against constitutional challenges. 249 A Maine court upheld
the state's civil protection statute against a procedural challenge stating that the statute is civil in nature and does not violate the respondent's constitutional right to a jury trial, notwithstanding the
availability of possible criminal sanctions for a subsequent contempt. 250 Finally, a Minnesota court held that a civil protection statute that mandated clerks to assist petitioners in filing for protection
orders did not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. 251
VII.

CONCLUSION

The answer to the domestic violence problem is an elusive one.
While the civil protection order is not a cure-all, it does offer immediate and temporary relief from abuse. 252 This avenue must remain
open in the interest of safety for abused spouses and children.
Many courts around the country adopt a similar view of the civil
protection order, and similar domestic violence statutes. 253 The statutes have withstood numerous constitutional challenges and remain
in effect today.254 The Maryland judiciary, like the aforementioned
244. See Klein, supra note 4, at 907 (citing Master v. Eisenhart, No. 90-2897 1991
Wisc. App. LEXIS 1270 (Wisc. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1991».
245. Id.
246. Id. (dismissing the constitutional challenges to the civil protection
statutes) .
247. Id.
248. Id. at 907-08 nn.654-57; Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988); Illinois v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742, 743, 746 (III. App. Ct.
1985) (noting that finding the respondent in contempt of the civil protection order for calling his ex-wife a prostitute and then threatening to kill
her did not violate respondent's free speech rights).
249. See Klein, supra note 4, at 908 nn.662-64 (citing Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d
376 (Me. 1990».
250. Id.
251. Id. at 908-09 nn.668-69 (citing Minnesota v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681
(Minn. 1981».
252. See supra Part IV.
253. See supra notes 126-35.
254. Id.
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states, recently and emphatically reminded the state that its civil protection order statute was alive and well and will continue to protect
women and children from abuse.
The court of appeals' recent clarification of Maryland's standard for
the issuance of the civil protection provides a consistent standard for
both the courts and petitioners. This consistency will hopefully make
Maryland's civil protection order that much more effective in the
state's battle against domestic violence. The legal communities of Maryland should follow the high court's lead and get involved. 255 Armed
with this ruling and the changes in Maryland's Domestic Violence Act,
the legal communities throughout the state should take affirmative
action against the state's perpetual domestic violence problems. The
court of appeals' endorsement of the civil protection order should go
a long way in helping the victims, and their advocates fight this battle.

Richard A. DuBose III

255. The Murphy article indicates that having an attorney present during the
application process "substantially increased the rate of success in obtaining
a protection order." Murphy, supra note 35, at n.76 and accompanying text.
The VAWA clinics are not enough. Pro bono volunteer work could alleviate
some of the difficulties that face battered women and substantially increase
the number of those who receive full protection.

